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INTRODUCTION 
In 1894, John Drinkwater, the befuddled, searching architect in John 
Crowley’s compelling fantasy, Little, Big, built his own home, Edgewood, “as a 
kind of compound illustration” of Victorian architectural styles.1 Rounding 
each corner, the visitor sees a different façade and interior – Italianate villa, 
Tudor manor house, neo-classical, country cottage – complete in itself, its 
attachment to the others invisible from a single perspective.  
Reading a small flurry of articles from the past few years attempting to 
describe the field of health law,2 one feels like a visitor to Edgewood. The 
different perspectives are pleasing in themselves, without necessarily 
revealing the whole. This essay examines what I call the “architecture” of the 
health law field. By this I mean, without pressing the metaphor too far, the 
framework of beams and studs in which interior spaces can be designed, 
furnished and accessorized in different ways.   
This essay addresses three primary questions. First, what is an academic 
field of law? Second, is health law such a field? Lastly, if it is, how can or 
should it be portrayed?  The first question may have no answer. There are no 
hard and fast rules for constituting an academic field of law, as explained 
below in Part IV. Scholars, like practicing lawyers, fashion their own spheres 
of expertise in response to practical need. This means that health law can 
                                                 
†  Professor of Health Law, Bioethics & Human Rights, Boston University School of 
Public Health; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of Socio-Medical 
Sciences and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine; Co-Director, 
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1  John Crowley, Little, Big 32 (Harper Perennial ed. 2006). 
2  See generally George J. Annas, Health Law at the Turn of the Century: From White 
Dwarf to Red Giant, 21 Conn. L. Rev. 551 (1989) [hereinafter White Dwarf]; M. Gregg Bloche, 
The Invention of Health Law, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 247 (2003); Henry T. Greeley, Some Thoughts 
on Academic Health Law, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 391 (2006); Mark A. Hall, The History and 
Future of Health Law: An Essentialist View, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 347 (2006) [hereinafter 
Essentialist View]; Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 Health Matrix 155 
(2004); S. Sandy Sandbar et al., Legal Medicine and Health Law Education, in Legal 
Medicine 3 (S. Sandy Sandbar et al. eds., 7th ed. 2007); Walter Wadlington, Some Reflections 
on Teaching Law and Medicine in Law School Since the ‘60s, 14 Health Matrix 231 (2004). 
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qualify as a distinct field of law for several different reasons, summarized in 
Part V. Therefore, I begin with the third question. After describing the 
challenges of doing so, I suggest a conceptual framework for describing the 
field. It is not a theory, nor a set of normative standards, but a description – 
an architecture, if you will. The framework offers a blueprint for identifying 
the principles worthy of consideration in identifying and analyzing legal issues 
affecting health, while also allowing room for debating the normative values 
that might govern particular sub-specialities or doctrines. 
I.  DESCRIBING HEALTH LAW: THE CHALLENGES 
Viewing the health law field as a whole, and as separate from other fields 
of law, encounters two major challenges: (1) the range of legal issues the field 
covers; and (2) the fact that many doctrines formerly unique to medicine have 
given way to more general principles from other legal domains.  
The first challenge is surely the sheer breadth of doctrines that potentially 
apply to health issues. These include aspects of administrative, antitrust, 
constitutional, contract, corporate, criminal, environmental, food and drug, 
intellectual property, insurance, international, labor/employment, property, 
taxation, and tort law. At first, it may seem impossible to master all the law 
that could be relevant to health issues. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s concern 
about dilettantism has some bite here.3 Lawyers who know too little about the 
fields they try to join together – especially non-legal fields – risk errors of fact 
or judgment. The concern is that familiarity with only small segments of 
another field can deteriorate into doctrinal dabbling, distorting more general 
principles. But this may say less about the legitimacy of the health law field 
than the degree of difficulty in mastering it. One cannot profess expertise in 
health law without a solid grounding in the principles that are brought to bear 
on health issues, and their underlying rationales.   
A possible response to the breadth problem is the practice of sub-
specialization, whereby scholars and practicing lawyers become familiar with 
the scope of the field, but develop expertise in a particular area. This is already 
common practice not only in health law, but also in other more traditional 
legal domains, such as constitutional law, where experts on the First 
Amendment may profess little knowledge of the negative commerce clause. 
Thus, the breadth problem is not necessarily an impediment to classification 
as an independent field of law. 
The second challenge in describing the boundaries of health law is that 
the doctrines and principles grounded in other legal domains have come to 
apply to health problems with less and less special adaptation to the particular 
circumstances of the medical profession or the physician-patient 
relationship.4 Doctrines look less like unique rules for health than relatively 
straightforward applications of principles of contract, tort, administrative law, 
                                                 
3  Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 
207, 207-08 (1996) (mocking “law and . . .” courses dedicated to a particular subject matter as 
dilettantism, analogous to “Law of the Horse.”).  
4  See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections 
on the Organization of Law, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 71, 76 (2008) (arguing that “a new field of legal 
study is justified when a discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal 
solutions.”). 
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or insurance, for example. This dilution of special rules followed health law’s 
transformation from a narrow field of medical jurisprudence to the broader 
field encompassing professional, financial and civic relationships among 
patients, government, health providers, and financing institutions. The most 
obvious example is the doctrine of informed consent, which applies principles 
of autonomy and self-determination to decisions about medical treatment and 
recognizes that physicians have no special prerogative to make these decisions 
for their patients.5 George Annas and other health law scholars have 
advocated for patients’ rights to make their own decisions about medical care, 
to be treated with dignity and in privacy in hospitals, and to have access to 
medical records of their treatment, among other rights individuals enjoy 
outside medical facilities.6   
Judicial and statutory recognition of patient rights was not only a victory 
for patients’ rights advocates, but also a response to changes in the science 
and practice of medicine.7 Other sets of rules once thought foreign to the 
medical profession, such as antitrust law, began to govern physicians and 
health care organizations in more or less the same manner that they applied 
to commercial businesses.8 Tort, contract and insurance principles are also 
increasingly brought to bear on health-related relationships with little 
alteration from their commercial origins.9 To be sure, many of these principles 
and doctrines are modified somewhat to suit the particular circumstances of 
health problems.10 Nonetheless, what is striking about health law doctrines 
today is how much less they diverge from the standards imported directly 
from other legal domains than they did a half-century ago.  
Paradoxically, as health law gained acceptance as a distinct specialty, the 
legal principles governing much of its subject matter loosened their parochial 
ties to medicine as the rationale for singular rules. The convergence of 
principles and doctrines as applied in the health law field with the principles 
and doctrines as applied in their fields of origin poses a dilemma for defining 
the boundaries of health law. On one hand, this convergence can be seen as 
welcome recognition of particular needs of patients, professionals or 
organizations in the health field. On the other hand, to the extent that 
principles are not distinctive, there may be less justification for claiming a 
unique field of health law. 
                                                 
5  Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (1984).  See generally Ruth 
R. Faden et al., A History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986). 
6  See generally George J. Annas, The Rights of Patients (3d ed. 2004).  
7  Wendy K. Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post-Modern Era, 13 L. & Soc. Inquiry 
385, 393 (1988). 
8  See generally Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., Inc., 440 U.S. 
205 (1979) (applying Sherman Act to Blue Cross); Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (applying Sherman Act to insurer). See also, Utah County v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (revoking hospital’s state tax 
exemption). 
9  See generally Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (liability for health 
insurance coverage denials under ERISA and state common law); American Manufacturers 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (insurers handling state worker 
compensation programs are not state actors for purposes of the 14th Amendment); Darling v. 
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 
383 U.S. 946 (1966) (applying corporate liability for negligence to hospital). 
10  See generally Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59 (1985) (physician’s duty of 
confidentiality). 
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II.  DESCRIBING THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH LAW 
Despite these challenges, the persistence and growth of health law as a de 
facto legal specialty still argues for its acceptance as a field of law. This is not 
to say that health law unequivocally meets the definition of a field of law; 
rather, as I describe in Part IV, there is no authoritative definition that must 
be met. Health law qualifies because people practice it, and there is little to 
gain by academic debates over whether what they do is a field or not. 
Furthermore, as I argue in Part V, the absence of an overarching theory of 
health law is no impediment to becoming a field of law. 
Nevertheless, if health law is a field, one should know what it includes. 
Ideally, health law should be described in a manner that gathers all the 
disparate legal doctrines into a comprehensible whole with observable 
commonalities, but without necessarily forcing it to adopt any normative goal. 
This requires accepting the applied nature of the field. The subject matter to 
which the law applies retains its singular importance. The reason we struggle 
with definitions is that what brings the different legal domains into play is the 
subject matter – health.   As the Task Force on Health Law Curricula noted, “a 
description of health law cannot be viewed as merely the sum of its 
component bodies of law . . . . The content of health law emerges only in the 
application of these various bodies of law to the domain of the health 
professions.”11 Today, I would replace “the domain of the health professions” 
with “social structures that affect health.” 
Health is the subject of law, but it is not the goal of law. Most 
fundamentally, health law adopts and adapts principles from other legal 
domains to protect the value of health within a framework of justice and the 
rule of law. Thus, it is not simply the rote application of contract doctrine to 
an agreement between entities that happen to be in the health field, but an 
interpretation of whether and how that doctrine ought to be modified both to 
achieve the goal of contract law and to recognize the value of health. In this 
very broad sense, health law has dual normative goals: justice and protection 
of health. 
The sense in which I use the concept of goals here is not to impose a 
requirement that the law must achieve specific normative ends. Rather, it 
recognizes that justice or the rule of law has its own goals and values.12 In one 
sense, most applied fields have dual goals. The difference between health law 
and “law and the horse” is that the latter need not ascribe any particular value 
to the horse, whereas health law does value health, but not as a sole end in 
itself. This type of goal works best, and perhaps only works where it expresses 
a very broad and highly abstract value, like keeping promises or protecting 
health. Imposed on more granular circumstances, a value becomes outcome 
determinative and often counterproductive.13 A value-driven legal structure 
                                                 
11  Am. Soc’y Law and Med., Health Law and Professional Education: The Report of the 
Task Force on Health Law Curricula of the American Society of Law and Medicine, 63 Det. L. 
Rev. 245, 254-55 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force]. 
12  See generally Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Liberty and the Rule 
of Law 3 (1979); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 
(2004); The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, 
eds., 1987).   
13  See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the 
Rule of Law (2006). 
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would convert a description of a field into a normative prescription for 
particular outcomes. If we knew what outcomes we wanted, why worry about 
the values of law? Laws would become merely a tool for achieving other ends. 
Just as not every contract need uphold the value of keeping promises, not 
every law need value health over other goods. For this reason, health law, like 
other applied fields, recognizes the importance of weighing the goals of law or 
justice equally with the value of protecting health.  
The value of health is an essential consideration, but not necessarily 
controlling in any particular setting or circumstance. Lawyers need to think 
carefully about when a legal principle is controlling and when the health 
concern is controlling. It is one thing to contextualize the application of legal 
principles in specific circumstances.14 It is quite another to subordinate 
general legal principles to the possibly self-interested goals of a particular 
industry or profession, no matter how congenial. This in no way precludes 
adapting principles to account for special obligations owed by physicians to 
patients by reason of a person’s status as a patient and the physician’s status 
as physician, for example. But that informs doctrinal development. It should 
not impose an overarching goal for law itself, not even in the health law field. 
At the same time, it is not enough to apply existing bodies of law to health 
issues. The very attempt at application challenges the meaning of the 
principles being applied.15  Recognizing the consequences of legal principles in 
the health context yields important insights into how we think about the 
relationship between individuals and government, as well as individual and 
social responsibility for health risks.16 Health law analyses are transforming 
the way we think about the body, personal information, and property.17 The 
interpretation of some laws related to health can affect the distribution of 
wealth and the allocation of resources. The application of health law 
principles has blurred the lines between medicine and public health, disease 
and health, and what it means to be a citizen, a consumer and a patient.18 
These and countless other applications reveal the importance of both law and 
health and the iterative process of interpreting their mutual influence.  
International law has already developed a conceptual framework for an 
architecture of the health law field in terms that recognize both the value of 
justice and the value of health. Looking at international conceptions of a field 
has the advantage of permitting comparative analysis of particular problems 
                                                 
14  See generally Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on 
Life and Law (1987); Brian Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and 
a Social Theory of Law (Oxford 1997); Mary L. Dudziak, Freedom is Not Enough: The 
Opening Up of the American Workplace (2006). 
15  See, e.g., Adam Wagstaff, Social Health Insurance Reexamined 20 (World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4111, 2007); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1999). 
16  See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in 
Health Reform, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 199 (2008). 
17  See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Wondergenes: Genetic Enhancement and the 
Future of Society (Indiana University Press) 84-86 (2003); Ruth Fletcher et al., Legal 
Embodiment: Analysing the Body of Healthcare Law, 16 Med. L. Rev. 321, 324-331 (2008).  
18  See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting American Health Care Consumers 9-
10 (2002); Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: 
Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. Contemp. 
Health L. & Pol’y 1, 3-4 (1998). 
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and laws across jurisdictional boundaries. It offers a common language for 
communicating with scholars and lawyers in other countries. In today’s world, 
health is a global issue, and laws affecting health reach across national 
boundaries in many ways.19 For this reason alone, awareness of the treatment 
of health in international covenants and documents may become an 
important part of teaching and practice.  
One need not have any interest in international or comparative law, 
however, to recognize parallels between laws governing health and health care 
in the United States and the conceptual framework for rights and obligations 
used in international covenants. 
The international language commonly used to discuss laws concerning 
health and health care was inspired by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), in particular its authoritative interpretation of Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR): 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”20 Article 12 sets forth a comprehensive, aspirational statement of 
what has come to be called the international human right to health, itself 
derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 21 The ECOSOC 
Committee recognized that the “right to health is not to be understood as a 
                                                 
19  See Economic Policy Comm., European Comm’n, The Impact of Aging on 
Public Expenditure: Projections for the EU25 Member States on Pensions, Health 
Care, Long-Term Care, Education and Unemployment Transfers 2004-2050 5 (2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/documents/2006/ageingreport_en.pdf; Obijiofor 
Aginam, Global Health Governance: International Law and Public Health in a 
Divided World 70 (2005); European Observatory on Health Sys. & Policies, Social 
Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe 4 (Richard B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004), 
http://www.euro.who.int/document/E84968.pdf. 
20  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI), Preamble, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) 
[hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.  
21  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.  The International Bill of Rights consists of The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, id., the ICESCR, supra note 20, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16 (1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.  Article 
25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right 
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”  Other articles specify related rights 
and the universality of all the rights described in the Declaration.  For example, Article 1 
states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  Article 2 states: 
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”  Article 5 states: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  Article 9 
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”  Article 12 states: “No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, supra. 
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right to be healthy,” something no one can guarantee.22 Rather, the 
Committee describes steps that signatory States Parties are expected to take, 
subject to their respective resources and other constraints on feasibility. 
Although the Committee contemplates that each country will adopt legislation 
or take other action to promote health, the precise nature of such actions 
remains subject to interpretation and, in practice, they are implemented 
differently and to varying degrees by each country.23  
General Comment No. 14 makes clear that, like all human rights, “[t]he 
right to health [in ICESCR Article 12] contains both freedoms and 
entitlements.”24 States Parties must not interfere with personal freedoms, and 
they must provide, to the extent feasible, the care and protection necessary to 
protect the health of everyone in their populations.  These obligations are 
described as the duty to “respect, protect, and fulfill” the right to health:  
 
(1) respect individual human rights and personal freedoms;  
(2) protect people from harm from external sources or third parties; and  
(3) fulfill the health needs of the population.25 
   
 
International Health Framework 
 
 
United States Health Laws 




• Liberty, informed consent 
• Privacy, confidentiality 
• Nondiscrimination 
• Access to emergency care 
Protect Health and Safety Regulation 
• Safety and quality standards 
o Food, medical products 
o Health professionals, facilities 
o Workplace and environment 
• Nondiscrimination 
o Access to care 
o Access to information 
• Health, safety and quality standards 
o Food, medical products 
o Health professionals, facilities 
o Workplace and environment 
Insurance 
• Nondiscrimination 
o Access to care 
o Access to information 
• Marketing standards 
o Consumer disclosure 
o Antitrust 
o Anti-fraud, abuse 
Fulfill Service and Benefit Programs 
• Ensure provision of care 
• Ensure health living conditions 
• Promote research 
• Provide education 
• Promote education 
• Direct service programs 
• Financing benefits, services 
• Conduct, support research 
• Support public and professional education 
• Provide information 
 
                                                 
22  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural 
Rights, Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, Annex IV, ¶ 
8, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22-E/C.12/2000/21 (2001) [hereinafter General Comment]. 
23  Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our 
Nation and World?, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1457, 1467 (2001).  
24  General Comment, supra note 22. 
25  Id. at Annex IV, ¶ 33.   
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These three obligations provide an organizational structure for 
categorizing laws affecting health in any country. The parallels between types 
of law relevant to protecting individual rights, regulating private entities, and 
government provision or financing of services are striking, at least to this 
observer.26 The table above illustrates how laws affecting health in the United 
States fall rather naturally into these categories. (The left hand column lists 
illustrative topic areas within the categories of respect, protection and 
fulfillment; the right hand column lists topics incorporated into Americans 
laws.) If we think about this structure architecturally, the three categories 
might represent three sections of the house, each with its particular 
framework. 
 Virtually all federal, state and local laws defining the rights and duties of 
private individuals and organizations, as well as those creating public 
programs and benefits, can be classified according to one of the three 
categories. Because the classification is based on the target of the law, some 
subjects can overlap categories.27 For example, in the international 
framework, prohibitions against certain forms of discrimination are found in 
both the first and second categories: the State has an obligation not to 
discriminate against individuals as part of its duty to respect the right to 
health and a further obligation to ensure that third parties do not 
discriminate as part of its duty to protect the right to health. This separation 
has the advantage of distinguishing between laws that assign responsibility 
directly to government and laws that impose obligations on private entities. 
The duty to respect the right to health requires the State to “refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health.”28 
This means that the State may not deny equal access to health services or 
health information, or initiate or enforce discriminatory practices. It also 
requires States to refrain from “applying coercive medical treatments,” 
meaning that States must respect individuals’ freedom to choose the type of 
care they receive and to refuse care they do not want.29 The duty of respect can 
be best understood as a duty of noninterference with basic human rights like 
liberty, privacy, dignity and freedom from arbitrary discrimination in the 
health context, so that individuals are neither denied access to care nor 
treated unfairly within any health setting. Indeed, it is generally believed to 
confirm that such fundamental rights must be respected in the health context. 
Such respect often takes the form of positive law protecting specific rights, 
                                                 
26  Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. 
Health L. 247, 250 (2005) (noting parallels); Wendy K. Mariner, Public Health and Law: 
Past and Future Vision, 28 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 525, 536-37 (2003) (same).  
27  Comment 14 from the twenty-second session distinguishes the three obligations 
primarily in terms of whether the State or third parties are providing or interfering with access 
to health services.  General Comment, supra note 22, Annex IV, at ¶ 33.  For example, 
Comment 14 mentions an obligation to refrain from marketing unsafe drugs as part of the duty 
to respect the right to health and the similar duty to control the marketing of medical 
equipment and medicines by third parties as part of the duty to protect the right to health, 
thereby accounting for countries with either public or private systems.  Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35. 
28  Id. at ¶ 33. 
29  Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35. 
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such as the right to informed consent to medical care.30 In the United States, 
the duty of respect can be seen in laws forbidding interference with individual 
rights, such as laws requiring informed consent to medical care and research 
and prohibiting invasions of privacy and discrimination in access to care.  
The obligation to protect requires affirmative action to ensure that third 
parties—essentially private entities – also do not interfere with the right to 
health. Where private parties provide goods and services, the State is expected 
regulate their activities by legislation, contract or other means. This includes 
ensuring that health professionals meet appropriate quality and competence 
standards, that food, medicines and health-related products are manufactured 
and marketed safely, and that industry does not pollute the water, air or soil.31 
It also requires legislation or other action to prevent third parties from 
limiting access to care, such as family planning and pre- and post-natal care, 
as well as accurate health information. It is important to note, however, that 
the international framework does not prescribe any substantive or structural 
requirements for positive law. Apart from the general notion that laws should 
not imperil health or violate human rights, countries are free to develop many 
different approaches to protecting health. 
United States laws that set health and safety standards fall easily within 
this category. They include professional and facility licensure laws, laws 
setting environmental standards, safety and health standards for workplaces, 
product standards and other laws intended to reduce health risks arising from 
products or the social or working environment. This is a broad category 
crossing a variety of legal fields, from administrative law to products liability. 
It includes anything that prevents the conduct of business in a way that could 
harm the health of patients, customers, workers or the general public. 
Sanitary standards for conducting businesses that can harbor and spread 
disease have existed since colonial times, applying to animal slaughtering 
operations, mortuaries, and milk pasteurization, for example.32 More modern 
examples include standards for clinical and research facilities, standards for 
manufacturing food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics, and even 
inspecting restaurants. Laws requiring licensure of health professionals, 
hospitals and other medical facilities are intended to ensure that those who 
are granted the privilege of providing care have at least a minimal level of 
competence and skill. Laws regulating health insurance set standards at least 
believed to promote access to care and prevent certain forms of 
discrimination. A huge number of national, state and local agencies, from the 
federal Food and Drug Administration to the local septic system inspection 
office, have been created to administer these regulatory systems.33 The 
common law also provides standards intended to protect health, as found in 
                                                 
30  See World Health Org., Patients’ Rights, 
http://www.who.int/genomics/public/patientrights/en/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (collection 
of international and national documents on patient rights). 
31  General Comment, supra note 22 at ¶¶ 35, 51.  The General Comment also mentions 
the obligation to refrain from marketing unsafe drugs and polluting the environment as part of 
the duty to respect.  See id. at ¶ 34. 
32  See generally William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in 
Nineteenth-Century America 14-15 (1996). 
33  See generally Kenneth R. Wing, The Law and the Public’s Health (6th ed. 
2004). 
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negligence law, products liability and even contract and insurance law 
applicable to health insurance. This category might also include laws that 
prohibit the sale of illicit drugs like heroin and marijuana, or the sale of 
cigarettes and alcohol to minors, and laws that authorize the involuntary 
detention of people who are likely to transmit contagious diseases to others 
and people who are likely to harm others because of mental illness. 
The obligation to fulfill requires countries to ensure that adequate health 
care is provided to the entire population, whether by public or private 
programs or a mixture of the two.34 Recognizing the social determinants of 
health, it also requires that everyone have equal access to safe food and water, 
basic sanitation, and adequate housing and living conditions. Ensuring care 
also includes providing for appropriate training for medical professionals and 
ensuring that a sufficient supply of hospitals and other health facilities 
accessible is to everyone in the country. Assisting individuals to enjoy the right 
to health includes fostering research and disseminating information to the 
public. Satisfying these duties entails enacting legislation, adopting regulatory 
measures or providing funding to develop affirmative programs.35 Here again, 
however, there is no substantive requirement for any particular approach. 
States may provide direct health services to all or some people in their 
countries, require third parties such as employers or insurers to pay for care, 
contract with third parties to offer care, or use a combination of approaches. 
The duty to fulfill can be seen in American laws that affirmatively create 
benefit programs – offering health care, services or information that 
individuals are free to accept or refuse. This includes a vast array of public 
programs to purify the water supply, organize disaster relief, provide medical 
care such as Medicare and Medicaid as well as state programs for those 
without health insurance, and fund public and private health programs like 
family planning clinics, child nutrition programs, substance abuse treatment 
centers, and refugee care facilities. It also includes public support for 
biomedical research and public information programs. The number and type 
of laws creating government programs in the fulfillment category has risen 
dramatically since the mid-twentieth century.  
Visualizing health laws as falling within these three categories has several 
virtues. First, it pays needed attention to the relationship between human 
health and respect for human rights.36 It embraces both the value of justice 
and the value of health. The ICESCR recognizes, in Article 4, that in order to 
protect people in the enjoyment of the right to health, some limits on 
individual rights may be required, but “the State may subject such rights only 
to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be 
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”37 This is intended to 
warn countries against using the right to health as a pretext for depriving 
                                                 
34  See General Comment, supra note 22, at ¶ 36. 
35  See id. at ¶ 37. 
36  See Sophia Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights, in Perspectives 
on Health and Human Rights 3, 3 (Sophia Gruskin et al. eds., 2005) (describing the 
recognition of the synergistic relationship between health and human rights).   
37  ICESCR, supra note 20, art. 4. 
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people of other human rights.38 Any limitation on freedom must be justified 
by its genuine contribution to preserving other freedoms and entitlements. In 
this way, basic human rights provide a boundary constraint for the choices of 
positive law that are permitted to protect health and fulfill health needs. This 
constraint guards against allowing the value of health to override the rule of 
law. 
Another advantage of this framework is that it includes all aspects of the 
health field: personal relationships, financial relationships, federal-state 
jurisdiction, contractual relationships, rights and responsibilities, and 
institutional structures. While health and healing may be the objectives of 
people who provide medical care and those who finance and regulate those 
services, there is much more to making health or healing possible. The range 
of social and environmental factors that affect health are often as or more 
important than medical care.39 The field of health continues to expand as 
more is learned about what affects health, especially socioeconomic factors, 
such as the distribution of income and wealth, political inequality, education, 
employment, housing, and the environment (known as the social 
determinants of health), as well as individual genetics, travel and migration, 
and climate change.40 Laws governing those factors should not be ignored.41  If 
institutional licensure and antitrust are included because they affect the way 
health care is made available, occupational and environmental factors that 
may affect health should be considered as well.42 They may solve problems 
that seem intractable when viewed as medical or health care problems alone. 
Adopting this broader vision is consistent with the history of health law, 
which has developed and expanded in response to advances in science and 
changes in the social institutions that affect health and medical care. 
Finally, and most importantly, although the framework acknowledges the 
relevance of many different factors affecting health, it does not prescribe any 
particular legal structure or set of doctrines. The overall question is how to 
organize social institutions (including rights and duties) to protect health and 
treat illness without jeopardizing essential human rights like autonomy and 
dignity. Answers to this question will necessarily embody normative values. 
                                                 
38  Id. at art. 5. 
39  See generally Comm’n on Soc. Determinants of Health, World                         
Health Org., Final Report: Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health                          
Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health (2008), 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf. 
40  See generally Why Are Some People Healthy and Others Not? The 
Determinants of Health of Populations (Roger G. Evans et al. eds., 1994); Ichiro 
Kawachi et al., Income Inequality and Health: A Reader (1999); World Health Org., 
Social Determinants of Health (Michael Marmot & R.G. Wilkerson eds., 2003), 
http://www.euro.who.int/document/e81384.pdf; Nancy E. Adler et al., Socioeconomic Status 
and Health: The Challenge of the Gradient, 49 Am. Psychologist 15 (1994); Adam Wagstaff & 
Eddy van Doorslaer, Income Inequality and Health: What Does the Literature Tell Us?, 21 
Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 543 (2000). 
41  See generally Barry Zuckerman et al., Why Pediatricians Need Lawyers to Keep 
Children Healthy, 114 Pediatrics 224 (2004); Steven H. Woolf et al., The Health Impact of 
Resolving Racial Disparities: An Analysis of US Mortality Data, 94 Am. J. Pub. Health 2078 
(2004). 
42  See A. J. McMichael et al., Global Environmental Change and Health: Impacts, 
Inequalities, and the Health Sector, 336 Brit. Med. J. 191, 193 (2008) (arguing that “the 
greater public health preventative challenge lies is stopping the process of climate change.”). 
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But the framework does not answer the “how” question itself. Instead, it leaves 
each country free to analyze the merits of specific choices for positive laws in 
each category. It is here that more specific debates take place about the 
justifiable objectives of particular laws and the merits of particular means to 
achieve them, from employer mandates to compulsory immunization. 
The international framework thus offers an architectural blueprint for 
constructing health laws.  Figure A, depicted at the end of this article, offers a 
rough illustration.  The obligation to respect can be seen as the foundation for 
two more stories, one protecting and the other fulfilling health needs. Laws 
protecting basic human rights, such as autonomy and privacy, frame the 
structure, creating boundary constraints as well as structural beams 
projecting through all the floors. Within each story are multiple rooms, 
furnished with relevant legal domains overlaying topic areas, as illustrated at 
the end of this article in Figure B. Debates over particular laws contribute to 
the discussion of how to furnish the rooms. Should government provide 
particular services directly, fund private entities to do so, require private 
organizations to provide services, or adopt some or all of these options? Which 
legal principles should govern? A few antiques may fit some rooms perfectly, 
while new pieces may be required in others. Some bits of furniture may need 
reupholstering to suit the room. The iterative process of adapting doctrine to 
suit the circumstances continues here. 
This vision of health law is less eccentric than the house of Edgewood, 
with its idiosyncratic, mismatched sections. The international framework 
offers an integrated, external architecture for housing the field of health law. 
In contrast to Edgewood, health law’s idiosyncrasies are inside, in the rich 
variation of its interior spaces. There is even room for considering 
international and comparative law. Importantly, by consolidating all types of 
law that affect health, it reminds us that there are many ways to solve health 
problems and that we should consider all the alternatives before automatically 
adopting a particular approach. 
III.  WHAT IS A FIELD OF LAW ANYWAY? 
The foregoing description explicitly recognizes, as do most observers, that 
health law is an applied field.43 To many, this confers an advantage and a rich 
opportunity to consolidate legal education in a way that mirrors actual 
practice.44 Some academic traditionalists, however, would not count an 
applied field as a “field of law.”45 This begs the question of why other generally 
accepted areas of study or practice should qualify as fields of law. By what 
standards and criteria, and for what purpose, is any particular area thought to 
qualify as a substantive field?46 This question turns out to be quite difficult to 
                                                 
43  White Dwarf, supra note 2, at 552-3; Sandbar, supra note 2, at 6. 
44  White Dwarf, supra note 2, at 567-8.  
45  Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207-08.   
46  Almost all recent articles examining applied fields of law refer to Easterbrook’s essay 
on cyberlaw.  Id.  See also Hall, supra note 2, at 355; Greely, supra note 2, at 404-05; Lessig, 
supra note 15, at 501. Easterbrook’s essay itself did not offer a definition for a field of law, 
apart from referencing an admonition that “‘Law and . . .’ courses should be limited to subjects 
that could illuminate the entire law.”  Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207. 
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answer. The literature is notable for the absence of an epistemology or meta 
theory for positively defining the essential characteristics of a “field of law.”47 
One possible answer, which may be the most accurate, is that separate 
fields have become accepted as a matter of historical accident or practical 
need. If longevity counts, one might take note that Blackstone’s Commentaries 
includes a chapter entitled “Of Offences Against the Public Health, and the 
Public Police or Economy,” dealing primarily with plague.48 Treatises on 
medical jurisprudence also date from the 19th century,49 including works by 
John Ordronaux, who taught on the law faculties of Boston University and 
Columbia University.50 
It might be argued that a field cannot be defined simply by the subject 
matter to which it applies. And yet many are defined in that manner, and they 
have ample precedent. Nineteenth century legal scholarship includes treatises 
on the law of highways,51 the law of railways,52 the law of telegraphs,53 and the 
law of building associations, which may be an ancestor of banking and mutual 
insurance law.54 
Legal texts summarizing the law in 18th and 19th century America contain 
somewhat different lists of fields of law (sometimes called subjects or 
                                                 
47  Authors describe particular fields in different terms, often without specifying 
independent criteria.  See, e.g., W. Cole Durham Jr., Revivifying the Field of Law and Religion, 
57 Emory L. J. 1411, 1411 (2008); Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and 
Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 Rutgers L. J. 165, 165 (2004) (taking “stock of the field 
of law and philosophy”); Lessig, supra note 15, at 502; Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for 
Information Law and Policy, 82 Or. L. Rev. 695, 700 (2003) (arguing for a new field of 
“information law” that focuses on information, in contrast to cyberlaw, which the author 
argues focuses instead on the technology). 
48  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: In Four Books 
161 (London, A. Strahan for T. Cadell and W. Davies 1803).  See also Thomas F. Gordon, A 
Digest of the Laws of the United States 553 (Philadelphia, printed for the author 1827) 
(including the chapter “Of Quarantines and Health Laws”).  See generally Bertram Jacobs, A 
Manual of Public Health Law (1912); LeRoy Parker & Robert H. Worthington, The 
Law of Public Health and Safety (Albany, M. Bender 1892).  
49  See J. H. Balfour Browne, The Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (London, J. 
& A. Churchill 1871); James C. Mohr, Doctors and the Law: Medical Jurisprudence in 
Nineteenth Century America (1993); John Ordronaux, Jurisprudence of Medicine in 
its Relation to the Law of Contracts, Torts, and Evidence (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. 
Johnson 1869); Isaac Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1838).  See also Sandbar, supra note 2, at 2 (briefly describing 
the history of medical jurisprudence in the United States).  
50  John Ordronaux, The Jurisprudence of Medicine in its Relations to the 
Law of Contracts, Torts, and Evidence (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2006) (1869).  See also 
Obituary Notes, January 21, 1908, N. Y. Times, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/                  
archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9E0DE0DD113EE033A25752C2A9679C946997D6CF (detailing 
Ordronaux’s teaching career at Columbia, Dartmouth, University of Vermont, and Boston 
University). 
51  Joseph K. Angell & Thomas Durfee, A Treatise on the Law of Highways; 
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1857). 
52  Isaac F. Redfield, Practical Treatise upon The Law of Railways. (Boston, 
Little, Brown, & Co. 1858) (Chief Justice of Vermont). 
53  William L. Scott & Milton P. Jarnagin, A Treatise upon the Law of 
Telegraphs; (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.1868). 
54  G. A. Endlich, The Law of Building Associations: Being a Treatise upon the 
Principles of Law Applicable to Mutual and Co-operative Building, Homestead, 
Saving, Accumulating, Loan and Fund Associations, Benefit Building Societies, & c., 
in the United States (Jersey City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. Law Publishers and Booksellers 
1882). 
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divisions) than their later counterparts. Nonetheless, many are described by 
the subjects to which the law described applies. 
In his 1868 text summarizing law, Joel Prentiss Bishop remarked, “the 
first thing to be noticed is, that the subjects run into and include one 
another.”55 For example, the law of evidence, although a recognized division in 
the law, pertained to the law of contracts, real property, personal property, 
torts, public wrongs, international public and private law, “and all the rest.”56 
Bishop argued that discussions “aimed at ascertaining what is the true 
scientific division of the legal field . . . are like the endeavors to find the 
philosopher’s stone, to square the circle . . . endeavors after what, in the nature 
of things, cannot be performed, because the thing itself does not exist.”57 
Many accepted fields of law exhibited blurred boundaries. Separate areas, 
such as the law of easements, the law of mortgages, the law of executory 
devises, and the law of estates eventually coalesced into the more general law 
of real property, while also touching on the law of contracts.58 Each area has a 
feathering edge where overlap is inevitable. Prosser might have expressed the 
difficulty of setting firm boundaries when he wrote: “tort is a field which 
pervades the entire law, and is so interlocked at every point with property, 
contract and other accepted classifications that . . . the categories are quite 
arbitrary and there is no virtue in them.”59 Yet, Prosser also developed a 
separate field of agency.60 Legal fields arise and fade away, expand and 
contract according to the problems and possibilities of contemporary society 
and commerce. So, the law of bills and notes has been overtaken by 
commercial transactions, which itself can be viewed as an aspect of contracts. 
This phenomenon of running together yet remaining apart continues 
today.  Compare the curriculum of almost any law school in 1950 with today’s 
curriculum. Only a small proportion of subjects remain the same in name and 
content. Family law, for example, has absorbed the older law of marriage, with 
its reliance on distinctions between public and private spheres of 
responsibility, yet also feathers into principles of contract, tort, wills and 
trusts. Property law has borrowed from real and personal property. Subjects 
that today seem commonplace, like securities law and insurance law, would 
have surprised our ancestors, while others to which they paid studious 
attention, like admiralty, restitution, or maritime law, have a narrower 
audience. New fields arise and gain acceptance despite their initial 
strangeness. In 1868, Bishop encouraged his readers to study the U.S. 
Constitution because, “Here is a new field.” 
Some areas acquire their distinctiveness, despite belonging to a larger 
conceptual sphere. Intellectual property has carved out a specialty area within 
property law. But for practical experience, antitrust law might be an aspect of 
contracts. For that matter, many fields of law might be brought under the 
                                                 
55  Joel Prentiss Bishop, The First Book of the Law; Explaining the Nature, 
Sources, Books, and Practical Applications of Legal Science, and Methods of Study 
and Practice. § 321, at 219 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868). 
56  Id. at 234. 
57  Id. at 220-221. 
58  Id. at 219. 
59  William J. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 2 (3d ed. 1964). 
60  See William Gregory, Gregory’s Hornbook on the Law of Agency and 
Partnership 2 (2001). 
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umbrella of contracts. If we were to collapse all the categories of law that 
belong to contracts and torts, we would have two vast fields indeed. Yet that 
might only inspire continuing the subdivisions as subspecialties of contracts, 
with little substantive change in current teaching or practice.61 
Bishop’s refreshingly honest appraisal of the difficulty of separating one 
field from another did not dissuade him from recognizing divisions: “Still, as a 
matter of practical convenience, we may divide off the legal field in various 
ways, as may best suit the particular purpose of the division, or our tastes.”62 It 
thus appears that the division of legal principles into fields of law remains a 
function of the purpose for which division is useful. Or perhaps it’s just a 
matter of taste. 
Most treatises describing fields of law make no effort to define fields 
according to any independent criteria. Nonetheless, one can discern three 
possible approaches to defining a discrete field. The first is by subject matter, 
taking the history and tradition of rules and customs associated with a 
particular subject, like maritime trade and the sea.63 The second centers on a 
statute or set of related documents.64 A growing number of fields fall into this 
second category, including trademark, administrative, bankruptcy, tax, and 
environmental law, as well as constitutional law and international public law. 
The third, and apparently smallest category, is defined by the overall purpose 
of the laws associated with the field. Here, contract law may be the best 
example. As defined in Corbin’s treatise, the purpose of contract law is “the 
realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making 
of a promise.”65 One might expect that a similar purpose could be stated for 
other traditional and enduring fields, but legal goals are not easily found or 
stated.66 
Fields of law appear to have grown up according to quite different 
principles of organization, principles that are neither mutually exclusive nor 
internally consistent. While some gather a variety of legal principles around a 
focal subject, others concentrate on a document that inspires interpretation. 
Some, like conflicts and evidence, seem more procedural than substantive. 
Surprisingly few are grounded in goals, conceptual principles or themes 
independent of the subject matter to which they apply. These may include 
                                                 
61  An analogy might be the specialty (and department) of medicine in medical schools, 
which includes many subspecialties, including cardiology, pulmonology, oncology, infectious 
diseases, and many others. 
62  Bishop, supra note 55, at § 327, 221. 
63  See Steven F. Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 1, at 1-2 (7th ed. 2005). 
64  See 1 Anne Gilson Lalonde et al., Gilson on Trademarks § 1.01[2], at 1-6 
(Matthew Bender 2008).  
65  Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §1.1, at 1 (Matthew Bender 2008). 
66  See Prosser, supra at note 59, at 2-3 (“there is a central theme, or basis or idea, 
running through the cases of what are called torts, which, while difficult to put into words, 
does distinguish them in a greater or less degree from other types of cases.”).  Prosser 
nonetheless objected to attempts “to reduce the entire law of torts to a single broad principle    
. . . .”  Id. at 4.  Yet he did define it as “a body of law which is directed toward the compensation 
of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered in respect of all their 
legally recognized interests, rather than one interest only, where the law considers that 
compensation is required . . . . The law of torts, then, is concerned with the allocation of losses 
arising out of human activities . . . .”  Id. at 6. 
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conflict of laws, contracts, criminal law, property, and torts, although property 
and torts admittedly feather out into the cornucopia of other legal fields, too. 
The lesson here is that no ultimate authority exists for defining a field of 
law. Defining a field by the subject matter around which legal principles are 
gathered has as credible a pedigree as any other approach. Complaints that 
“law and …” fields are necessarily illegitimate overstate the case. In the 
absence of any compelling argument for adherence to rigid boundaries, a field 
may be defined by its own practitioners for their purposes or tastes. The test 
of its validity lies in whether others accept it. 
IV.  ACCEPTING HEALTH LAW 
The world of practicing lawyers has definitely accepted health law as a 
specialty. The public and private programs, activities, and businesses that 
finance, provide, and oversee health care account for more than 16 percent of 
the country’s gross domestic product.67 Expertise in laws governing the health 
sector is taken seriously for that reason alone. Today’s law students are 
increasingly likely to encounter health law issues in their careers and certainly 
in their personal lives. The practice of law now includes substantial segments 
devoted to health-related issues. Moreover, the organizational structure of the 
practice of law has changed.68 Larger firms offer specialty groups within a 
national general practice. The number of federal, state and local agencies 
involved with health-related issues increased dramatically in late 20th century, 
and lawyers have been welcomed at those agencies, as well as at hospitals, 
pharmaceutical companies, and advocacy organizations, to name only a few. 
Whatever one might think of the appropriate roles of graduate education and 
professional training, law schools need to train students for these careers.69 
Furthermore, those who teach health law must define their subject, if only to 
decide what to teach.70 Students also need to know the general boundaries of 
the terrain to be covered.71 
                                                 
67  Aaron Caitlin et al., National Health Spending in 2005: The Slowdown Continues, 
26 Health Affairs 142, 142 (2007); John A. Posal et al., Health Spending Projections 
Through 2016: Modest Changes Obscure Part D’s Impact, 26 Health Aff. w242, w242 (2007) 
(projecting 19.6% of GDP by 2016). See also Thomas M. Selden &                                           
Merrile Sing, The Distribution of Public Spending for Health Care in                                          
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for Medicare and Medicaid, Services, National Health Expenditure Data, 
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68  John P. Heinz et al., Urban Lawyers: The New Social Structure of the Bar 
1-9 (2005); Robert Nelson, The AJD Project: The First National Longitudinal Study of Lawyer 
Careers, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 355, 357-58 (2007) (reporting a shift from professional firms to 
large firms and organizations, both public and private, an increase in specialization and 
business representation among practicing lawyers, and “a very stark prestige hierarchy across 
fields of law.”).  
69  White Dwarf, supra note 2, at 554. 
70  I confess to attempting the same thing when I began teaching health law.  I initiated 
and chaired the Task Force on Health Law Curricula, which produced a report, “Health Law 
and Professional Education,” for the American Society of Law and Medicine.  Task Force, 
supra note 11.  The Task Force was charged with developing not a theory, but an overview of 
the health law field, describing the objectives of teaching health law, and making 
recommendations for curriculum content.  It was a practical report for faculty.   However, it 
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With so many lawyers teaching and practicing what they call health law, it 
is hard to assert that no such field exists.72 Defining it more elegantly and 
succinctly than I have tried to do in Part III above is both appealing and 
challenging.73 Definitions tend to fall into two general categories: (1) 
definitions or descriptions based on topics or policy goals;74 and (2) normative 
theories about the goals of health law in whole or in part.75 Textbooks for 
teaching and practical treatises and manuals often use the first category, 
dividing the subject matter into subcategories familiar to practicing lawyers: 
subjects, such as liability, financing, corporate regulation, and bioethics; and 
policy goals, such as quality, cost, access, and autonomy. Alternatively, they 
divide it into structural components, such as international, governmental, 
institutional, and individual. 
The topic-oriented approach has left some observers hungry for common 
legal themes to unite the components into more than a collection of health-
related problems.76  Some academics wish to endow the field with the higher 
credibility that law faculties accord to scholarship addressing legal theory.77 
The more ambitious souls have offered ideas toward constructing a theory of 
                                                                                                                      
claimed, perhaps presumptuously, to present a conceptual model of health law as a working 
definition of the field, but cautioned that its report was highly preliminary and expected the 
field to evolve with the subject matter, as it indeed has. 
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health law, however defined.  See generally Wendy E. Parmet, Populations, Public 
Health, and the Law (2009) (arguing for imbuing certain constitutional law doctrines with 
what she calls the public health perspective, without purporting to define the field); Nan D. 
Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 Yale J. 
Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 93 (2006). 
76  See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 
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77  Greeley, supra note 2, at 402, 407. 
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health law,78 efforts that have been regarded variously with enthusiasm and 
bemusement within the academy.79 Given that law review articles are largely 
ignored outside the academy,80 the audience for legal theory scholarship is 
limited. Where tenure standards favor theory over utility, however, junior 
faculty may have to find some strands of theory or at least doctrinal 
convergence in their topics. So faculty continue to look for the thematic 
threads that tie disparate health law issues together, much as scholars stitched 
together earlier groupings to posit a “law” of intellectual property or family 
law.81 Normative theories respond to this aspiration. 
Normative theories have focused on professional values,82 economics,83 
and social goals, regulatory authority, and public expectations.84 These may be 
seen as values that do or should influence legal doctrine applicable to 
problems in the health field or as goals for the law to achieve. 
The special relationship between physicians and patients was a defining 
feature of medicine and law in its early days.85 Both the values of the medical 
profession and its tradition of self-regulation offered a measure of 
distinctiveness to justify special rules for physicians and patients.86 Today, 
however, professional self-regulation has been diminished – and tarnished87 – 
so substantially that it no longer serves as a field-defining attribute.88 
Furthermore, professional self-regulation begs the question of whether the 
medical profession can be distinguished from the legal profession or any other 
for the purpose of crafting unique legal rights or responsibilities. More 
fundamentally, the very concept of profession has undergone intense 
questioning about whether it is possible to distinguish professions from other 
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commercial endeavors, and therefore whether professionals should be 
accorded different legal treatment by virtue of their calling alone.89 
Law and medicine, not to mention the care delivery and financing 
institutions, have evolved so significantly that professionalism alone cannot 
offer thematic consistency across the entire range of issues within health law. 
The rise of hospitals and other health facilities, health insurance, and 
government agencies to regulate facilities, research, pharmaceuticals, and 
everything in between encouraged viewing the field as an industry amenable 
to economic analysis. Academic and perhaps political disagreements over law 
and economics approaches can tag the debate with a tinge of partisanship. 
These conceptions of health law offer important perspectives on particular 
legal principles, but most seem too broad or too narrow, too subject-driven or 
too value-laden, to constitute an overarching normative goal for the field as a 
whole. They also carry the risk of legal instrumentalism – forcing law to 
achieve the goals of non-legal fields, like banking, insurance, or medicine.90 
Law can sometimes be a means to an end, but law has its own ends which 
should never be forfeited.91 
For the most part, normative theories compete to resolve more specific 
issues within a field.92 In this role, they sometimes reflect philosophical 
preferences for specific outcomes. It may be too much to expect any normative 
theory to embrace an entire field objectively. Certainly, no single theory has 
proved generally acceptable. This suggests that descriptions of the field should 
avoid normative stances. 
Normative theories about health law have other disadvantages as a 
conceptual framework for a legal domain. Most normative theories limit their 
scope to medical care, typically excluding mental health, environmental 
health, public health, and social, economic and political conditions. Even 
thoughtful examinations that seek common themes across the spectrum of 
norms largely limit themselves to medical care and its financing.93 Narrowing 
may be a practical necessity when organizing law school courses, but it fails to 
capture the growing interconnectedness of health issues today. 
Mark Hall notes that one might regard health law “as an intellectual field 
defined more by method than by substance – that method being some version 
of comparative institutional analysis.”94 But, as he also correctly recognizes, 
comparing different theoretical approaches to analyzing an issue is a 
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technique used in most legal domains.95 Not being unique to health law, 
analysis cannot serve as a basis for distinguishing it from other fields. Nan 
Hunter proposes “risk governance” as a theoretical paradigm applicable to 
insurance and risk in medical care.96 This approach has the value of 
recognizing law’s central function as a risk allocation device. Yet because risk 
allocation it also a generic concept that pervades most legal fields – think of 
criminal law – it may serve best as a lens through which to view specific 
principles and doctrines, rather than as a defining attribute of health law. 
These approaches have enriched our thinking about health law issues, but 
have not generated consensus. No single methodological approach, 
perspective or normative paradigm seems capable of encompassing the range 
of legal issues in the health field. They are best suited to interpreting 
principles and adapting doctrines and rules. Normative theories give us fresh 
perspectives on how to choose the right rule, for example whether direct 
government intervention or a standard for private entities to obey. In health 
law’s architecture, they can direct us to one floor or another and guide how we 
design and furnish each room. They belong inside the house of health law, but 
they are too specific to construct its entire framework. In any event, there does 
not appear to be any satisfactory reason for making a normative theory a 
prerequisite to recognizing a field of law. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Health law is an eclectic and integrated translegal field, drawing on 
multiple domains of law to create an identifiable applied field of law. It 
applies and adapts existing law to protect health within the constraints of 
justice and human rights. Accomplishing this requires identifying all laws that 
affect health and evaluating their capacity to improve health without violating 
or impairing human rights. The international health framework provides a 
valuable, functional description of the health law field, because it 
encompasses virtually all the institutional and private structures and 
relationships needed to attend to people’s health, as well as the range of legal 
doctrines available to address health concerns. The international health 
framework recognizes both the singular value of health to human beings and 
the impossibility of protecting, preserving or restoring health without legally 
sanctioned social institutions that respect human rights. It also encourages 
reflection on both the substantive and procedural contours of laws that might 
address health problems. It accomplishes this without imposing more specific 
normative goals on law itself. Viewing health law as a structure for making 
health the subject of law will, I hope, encourage continued examination and 
debate over the field’s interior spaces. 
At Edgewood, the house that Drinkwater built was home to generations of 
a family whose members exhibited beliefs in tradition, progress, literacy, 
laziness, nurturance, nonsense, and the occasional communion with faeries. 
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Today’s house of health law accommodates an equally eclectic collection of 
scholars and practicing lawyers and promises many generations to come. Yet, 
unlike Edgewood, our home has changed, growing much larger and creating 
an increasingly cohesive external architecture from the values of justice and 
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